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WHITENESS AT WORK
Lihi Yona*
How do courts understand Whiteness in Title VII litigation? This Article 
argues that one fruitful site for such examination is same-race discrimination cases 
between Whites. Such cases offer a peek into what enables regimes of Whiteness 
and White supremacy in the workplace, and the way in which Whiteness is 
theorized within Title VII adjudication. Intra-White discrimination cases may 
range from associational discrimination cases to cases involving discrimination against 
poor rural Whites, often referred to as “White trash.” While intragroup 
discrimination is acknowledged in sex-discrimination cases and race-discrimination 
cases within racial minority groups, same-race discrimination between Whites is 
currently an under-theorized phenomenon. This Article maps current cases dealing 
with racial discrimination between Whites, arguing that these cases suffer from 
under-theorization stemming from courts’ tendency to de-racialize Whiteness and 
see White people as ‘not being of any race.’ This tendency has led to a limited 
doctrine of same-race discrimination between Whites, affording it recognition only 
when racial minorities are involved. Acknowledging Whiteness as a racial project—
the product of White supremacy—may enable courts to better theorize intra-White 
discrimination. Such possible theorization is developed via the stereotype doctrine. 
Accordingly, same-race discrimination and/or harassment between Whites is often a 
result of Whites policing other Whites to conform to stereotypes and expectations 
regarding Whiteness, i.e., how White people should act or with whom they may 
associate. Recognizing dynamics of intra-White racialization and the racial work 
behind Whiteness, this Article concludes, is aligned with Title VII’s anti-
subordination goals, as it is in the interest of racial minorities as well.
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INTRODUCTION
How is Whiteness theorized in Title VII jurisprudence? Courts de-
ciding racial discrimination cases deal with Whiteness on a regular basis. 
However, their understanding of Whiteness is limited, as is the under-
standing of most race scholars who limit their discussion on Whiteness to 
White people’s privileges or to Whiteness’ invisibility. Such a tendency, 
this Article argues, stems from the fact that Whiteness is mostly examined 
through contrast, i.e. through the lives and experiences of racial minori-
ties. But, the nature of Whiteness as a racial project—the project of 
White supremacy—is better realized when looking at intra-White dy-
namics, that is, when examining Whiteness against itself.
Through careful examination of race theory from the margins of 
same-race discrimination cases between Whites, this Article argues, we 
are offered a peek into what enables regimes of Whiteness and White su-
premacy and how they operate within the workplace. Unpacking intra-
White dynamics is crucial for examining how Whiteness is policed with-
in the workplace and allows us to craft additional ways to combat regimes 
of White supremacy at work.
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Intragroup discrimination has long been recognized by the courts as 
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, 
courts recognize the possibility that women may discriminate against oth-
er women on the basis of sex, for instance by sexually harassing female 
employees.1 Similarly, discrimination by Blacks and other racial minori-
ties against their own group members is recognized in Title VII jurispru-
dence.2 Title VII has also expanded to encompass situations where men 
harass or discriminate against other men on the basis of sex, usually in in-
stances where the performance of masculinity by those discriminated 
against does not meet their supervisor’s or colleagues’ expectations.3
However, there is currently almost no discussion, in the courts or in legal 
scholarship, of the possibility that Whites may racially discriminate against 
other Whites. This is no coincidence. The failure to recognize most types 
of same-race discrimination between Whites results, this Article argues, 
from courts’ tendency to de-racialize Whiteness. Whiteness’ privilege of 
invisibility, which has made White norms the default, also prevents courts 
from recognizing Whiteness as a racial category that polices itself on its 
members. This inability is manifested through the courts’ limited recog-
nition of intra-White discrimination.
Courts should acknowledge this type of discrimination. They can 
do so by adopting the stereotype doctrine developed under Title VII. 
Under the stereotype doctrine, discrimination based on societal expecta-
tions regarding how people from certain groups ought to behave is for-
bidden. Thus, cases where White people police other Whites based on 
their expectations of how White people should act, speak, dress, etc., 
should be regarded as forbidden race discrimination.
The possibility of intra-White discrimination is ever more relevant. 
Alt-right, White pride, and White nationalist/supremacist movements, all 
of which see Whiteness as a category with concrete content and distinct 
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 273 (D. Utah 
1996) (“Title VII does not exclude from protection same-sex sexual harassment . . . . Ac-
cordingly, this court holds that a cause of action exists under Title VII for victims of 
same-sex sexual harassment.”); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. 
Penn. 1995) (“This Court finds that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title 
VII.”).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Light-skinned
[B]lacks sometimes discriminate against dark-skinned [B]lacks, and vice versa, and either 
form of discrimination is literally color discrimination.”); Walker v. Sec’y of Treasury, 
IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
3. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (concluding that 
“sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title 
VII”); EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2013) (recogniz-
ing that “a plaintiff may establish a sexual harassment claim with evidence of sex-
stereotyping” and finding that there was evidence that the superintendent in the case har-
assed the plaintiff because he did not think the plaintiff was “a manly-enough man”).
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borders maintained by its members, have become more prevalent in re-
cent years.4 These groups promote racist norms regarding Whiteness and 
its legitimate manifestations within American society.5 Their popularity 
may lead to an increased number of intra-White discrimination cases in-
volving employers who enforce such ideas of Whiteness on their White 
employees or White employees who harass White colleagues for failing 
to “act White.”
Part I of this Article argues that Title VII ought to be understood as 
a law that forbids certain ideologies from dictating employment decisions 
rather than one that protects specific identities in the workplace. Such 
framing of Title VII is consistent with both Title VII’s language and its 
original purpose. Part II sketches the various ways in which courts have 
recognized same-race discrimination, focusing first on discrimination be-
tween racial minorities and then on discrimination between Whites. 
While courts generally have been open to acknowledging intraracial dis-
crimination between racial minorities, a review of same-race discrimina-
tion cases between Whites indicates that it has only been recognized in 
limited circumstances. The “strongest” set of circumstances is currently 
known as “associational discrimination” referring to instances where 
White employers discriminate against White employees because of their 
association with racial minorities. Part III describes and critiques the cur-
rent theorization of associational discrimination, arguing that it de-
racializes Whiteness, thus missing the main dynamic at play in these acts 
of discrimination. This problematic theorization leads to courts’ limited 
recognition of discrimination between Whites, which is restricted to sce-
narios in which racial minorities are involved. Part III then offers an al-
ternative theoretical framework—the stereotype doctrine.
Part IV suggests scenarios that are missed by the current theorization 
and may be recognized via the stereotype doctrine. Examining stereo-
types against poor rural Whites, often referred to as “White trash,” I ar-
gue that these stereotypes revolve around the “right” ways to perform 
Whiteness. Accordingly, discrimination against poor Whites may some-
4. Kirk Siegler & Amita Kelly, Alt-Right Groups Splinter, Distance from White Suprema-
cy, NPR (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/11/637320471/after-
charlottesville-alt-right-groups-splinter-distance-from-white-supremacy (“After the dead-
ly violence in Charlottesville, it appears far-right groups not closely tethered to [W]hite 
supremacy are having their moment.”); Sarah Begley, White Supremacist and Black Nation-
alist Groups Both Grew During Trump’s First Year as President, TIME (Feb. 21, 2018), http://
time.com/5168677/donald-trump-hate-groups-splc/ (“President Donald Trump’s first 
year in office was marked by an increase in both [W]hite supremacist groups, as well as a 
backlash in the growth of [B]lack nationalist groups, according to a new report Wednes-
day by an organization that closely tracks what it defines as hate groups.”).
5. See White Nationalist, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
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times be seen as forbidden racial discrimination, especially when the one 
acting in a discriminatory manner is White. Part V addresses a possible 
challenge to my argument based on anti-subordination theory, demon-
strating the potential advantages my argument offers to racial minorities. 
Part VI offers a concrete suggestion as to how courts should adopt my 
argument.
I.  Title VII: From Identity to Ideology
A key question that shapes discussions of antidiscrimination theory 
revolves around the essence and purpose of antidiscrimination law. This 
question is usually approached via the distinction between anti-
classification, anti-subordination, and, lately, anti-essentialism theories of 
antidiscrimination.
According to anti-classification theory, the injury caused by dis-
crimination results from the act of distinction between or classification of 
individuals.6 Anti-classification theory, which is largely identified with 
ideas of formal equality, focuses on identitarian traits (e.g. race, gender, 
and national origin) that are seen as illegitimate grounds for classification.7
The way to achieve equality, according to this theory, is to ignore these 
traits.8 Anti-classification theory mostly focuses on disparate treatment
and disregards larger questions of historical and structural inequality.9
In contrast, anti-subordination theory places historical inequality 
and structural modes of oppression at its center.10 Under the anti-
subordination view, the law should be concerned with remedying the 
conditions that allow for the disadvantage of historically oppressed 
groups.11 To fully achieve justice, we must not ignore the identities of 
different individuals, but rather acknowledge them and their social and 
historical meaning. Anti-subordination theory places a heavy weight on 
disparate impact, as it focuses the legal system’s attention to the realities of 
racial discrimination, even in instances where an employment decision 
may seem neutral or objective.12
6. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassi-
fication or Antisubordination?, 58 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 15 (2003).
7. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 
ALA. L. REV. 955, 963 (2012).
8. Id.
9. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472 (2004).
10. Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 155 (2017).
11. Id.; See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 6, at 9.
12. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 
2157-58 (2012).
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Writers on equality describe a turn in recent years from the anti-
subordination paradigm, which reflected Title VII’s origins, towards an 
anti-classification paradigm.13 Cases like Ricci v. DeStefano and Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes have seriously challenged disparate-impact litigation as well as 
social-framework theories associated with anti-subordination.14 Further, it 
is argued that recent anti-discrimination laws such as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Genetic Information Act have tilted the 
antidiscrimination scale towards anti-classification ideals of equality.15 Part 
of this turn is explained through anti-subordination theory’s focus on 
identity, which seems increasingly less relevant to lawmakers and courts 
that have embraced the view of a post-identity era.16 This sentiment is 
most visible in Title VII race-discrimination cases, where the constitu-
tional commitment to colorblindness has arguably “spilled over” into Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence.17
While recent judicial and legislative developments indicate disdain 
for identitarian-based policies, anti-essentialist views on antidiscrimina-
tion provide an important alternative. Anti-essentialism as an approach to 
antidiscrimination law first emerged as a critique of racial and gender jus-
tice struggles’ potential to essentialize identities and to allow courts to 
weigh in on questions regarding groups’ and individuals’ ontological 
traits.18 Richard Ford, for instance, raised the concern that “racial cul-
ture” arguments—i.e., braids are a proxy for African American women’s 
race—essentialize race and can potentially lead to graver racial discrimina-
13. See Richard Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protec-
tion and Disparate Impact After Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 295 (Anne Marie Lofaso & Samuel Estreicher eds., 
2015); Areheart, supra note 7, at 966; Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the 
Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination The 40th Anni-
versary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Symposium, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
431, 463-64 (2004); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-
Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 229, 231-32 (2010).
14. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory,
20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 921. See generally Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 
(2011); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
15. Areheart, supra note 7, at 968.
16. Id. at 999-1000.
17. Bornstein, supra note 14, at 966.
18. Ontological traits are traits that both define one’s nature of being and can be gen-
dered or racialized, like women being associated with traits such as dresses and uteruses, 
and braids being regarded as a black trait. For a critical discussion on racial ontological 
traits, see KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (2012), which provides that the belief in the invisible 
ontology of race is both rational and irrational at the same time, given the connection be-
tween invisible, socially constructed ontologies and their actual, material consequences.
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tion.19 Other writers have developed additional critiques of both racial-
and gender-justice projects.20 Anti-essentialist theories “see group-based 
identities as constructed and contested through social interaction, not as 
fixed and stable properties of the individual.”21 They urge us to move 
from identities on the ground to the ideologies that construct them. The 
law’s objective under anti-essentialism is to destabilize mechanisms that
reinforce and construct individual and group identities.22 Accordingly, 
Title VII and other antidiscrimination legislation under an anti-essentialist 
framework are aimed at combating oppressive ideologies such as White 
supremacy, racism, sexism, hetero-normativity, and ableism.
This Article shares the view that Title VII jurisprudence should be 
developed along the theoretical lines of anti-essentialism. Anti-
essentialism—which shares both anti-subordination theorists’ goal of dis-
mantling structures of power as well as anti-classification theorists’ disin-
clination towards identity-based policies—can potentially help refocus 
Title VII on historical and structural forms of oppression. An anti-
essentialist view would be less concerned with advancing the number of 
categories protected by antidiscrimination legislation and more concerned 
with how workplaces are gendered and raced according to different con-
19. RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 29-33 (2009).
20. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 373 (1991) (arguing that essentialism in legal theories of an-
tidiscrimination excludes the experiences of those situated at the intersection of race and 
gender). See also Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of 
Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83 (2008) (arguing for an 
anti-essentialist approach to trans rights in antidiscrimination law); Angela P. Harris, Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588-89 (1990) (arguing 
that the concept of gender essentialism in feminist legal theory can also apply to race) 
[hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Ian Haney López, Race and Color Blindness After 
Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 61 (2005) (arguing that color-
blindness divorces race from social meaning and cannot effectively promote social justice).
21. Clarke, supra note 10, at 145.
22. Id.
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servative ideologies (e.g. hetero-patriarchy,23 White supremacy) that dis-
advantage anyone who does not fit these ideological expectations.24
Despite its seemingly radical position towards social institutions 
(such as the law itself),25 anti-essentialist theories are consistent with Title 
VII’s language. Jessica Clarke argues that, unlike the ADA, which defines 
“people with disabilities” as its protected class, Title VII is a symmetrical 
law that does not designate any protected class.26 Section 703(a), which 
defines unlawful employment practices as those discriminating against any 
individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin,”27 forbids racial discrimination against racial majority and 
minority group members alike.
Clarke further argues that, while it is possible to see the original 
language of Title VII as focused on the identitarian traits of individuals, 
the 1991 amendment that added Section 703(m) reinforced Title VII’s 
non-identitarian slant.28 Section 703(m) states that “an unlawful employ-
ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice.”29 The provision not only signals a move 
away from identity-based jurisprudence—shifting the Archimedean point 
of proving discrimination claims from the victims’ identity to the motiva-
tion behind the discriminatory act—but also signals a step towards ideol-
23. Hetero-patriarchy fuses two ideological systems that often work conjointly: hetero-
sexism/heteronormativity and patriarchy. As Francisco Valdes describes it, the ideology of 
compulsory heteropatriarchy rests on four key tenets: 1) the bifurcation of personhood 
into “male” and “female” components under the active/passive paradigm; 2) the polariza-
tion of these male/female sex/gender ideals into mutually exclusive, or even opposing, 
identity composites; 3) the penalization of gender atypicality or transitivity; and 4) the 
devaluation of persons who are feminized. The combined impact of these four tenets is 
compulsory hetero-patriarchy. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the 
Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins Symposium, 8 YALE J.L.
HUMAN. 161, 170 (1996).
24. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259 (1999) (arguing that traditional notions of the “working identity” that apply 
pressure on employees to conform to certain behaviors at work are a form of employment 
discrimination) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity].
25. Anti-essentialism may seem more radical as it tries to combat discrimination 
through a challenge to its root causes—the structures that constitute the identities that are 
discriminated against—rather than through forbidding classification between identities or 
protecting subordinated identities once they are formed. See supra notes 20 and 23.
26. Clarke, supra note 10, at 110.
27. Title VII § 703(a).
28. Clarke, supra note 10, at 114.
29. Title VII § 703(m). See also Clarke, supra note 10, at 114 (providing that § 703(m) 
“includes no limitation based on an individual’s own identity”).
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ogy-based claims.30 Under Section 703(m), an individual must demon-
strate that the ideology behind the relevant employment practice was 
wrongfully motivated by race, color, religion, etc.31 Put differently, Title 
VII is not aimed at protecting women in the workplace but rather at for-
bidding sexism in the workplace; it is designed not to protect Black and 
Latino workers but to forbid racism as a motivation behind employment 
decisions or conduct.
Anti-essentialist theory is relevant to intragroup discrimination be-
cause the motive behind such acts of wrongful discrimination is usually 
ideological, not identitarian. Under this framework, when a female em-
ployer discriminates against women in the course of hiring for a position, 
the relevant factor is arguably not the identities of the parties involved 
but the ideology that dictates or motivates the act: chauvinism, sexism, or 
heteronormativity. Similarly, when a Black employer harasses a Black 
employee by giving him harsher assignments and referring to him as a n-
word, anti-essentialist theory would characterize it as an act of echoing 
and reproducing White supremacist ideological norms. Cases of in-
tragroup discrimination often force courts to acknowledge the ideology 
behind patterns of discrimination, following along the theoretical lines of 
anti-essentialism. Furthermore, it allows the acknowledgment of intra-
group discrimination’s role in constructing group identities.
Anti-classification theory is limited in analyzing such cases, as the
theory does not recognize concepts such as stigma, structural ideological 
oppression, or internalized racism or sexism. Therefore, anti-
classificationists’ ability to theorize such dynamics is limited, and the dis-
criminatory act itself might be seen as perplexing and thus resulting from 
other, non-forbidden reasons. The strong identitarian grip of anti-
subordination theory also limits its ability to theorize intragroup discrimi-
nation, as doing so requires moving beyond fixed identity classifications 
rather than deferring to the employer’s identity.32
30. For a discussion on the motivational efficacy of ideology within workplaces, see 
Ysanne M. Carlisle & David J. Manning, The Concept of Ideology and Work Motivation, 15 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 683, 685 (1994) (stating, “just as technology concerns an 
awareness of the motive power of controlled energy systems, and theology concerns an 
awareness of God and the motivation of religious practice, so an ideology is concerned 
with an awareness of the self and the motive sense of self-enactment in human conduct 
including that ‘at work’ ”).
31. Notably, this amendment was added, among other reasons, to account for cases 
involving stereotyping, following Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 280 (1989). 
See Clarke, supra note 10, at 114. As I will argue later in this Article, stereotype doctrine 
is closely linked to the ideology of the workplace, rather than to the individual identity 
traits of the plaintiff.
32. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 147. While Clarke focuses on anti-subordination 
theory’s fixation on the identity of the plaintiff, I utilize her argument to challenge anti-
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II.  A Taxonomy of Intragroup Race Discrimination
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of intrara-
cial discrimination on three notable occasions. First, in Castaneda v. Par-
tida, a jury-selection case involving a Mexican American, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[b]ecause of the many facets of human motivation, it 
would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one 
definable group will not discriminate against other members of that
group.”33 Second was Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, a case regarding 
§1981 discrimination34 against an Arab employee who argued racial dis-
crimination.35 Given that his Arab identity was categorized as part of the 
“White race” by the Court, the Court addressed the possibility of intrara-
cial discrimination. Rejecting the biological understanding of race as a 
criterion for evaluating discrimination claims, it stated that
It has been found that differences between individuals of the 
same race are often greater than the differences between the 
“average” individuals of different races. These observations 
and others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude 
that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, ra-
ther than biological in nature.36
This case was understood by lower courts to open up the possibility for 
same-race discrimination claims under both § 1981 and Title VII.37 Final-
ly, Justice Scalia in Oncale v. Sundowner Services referenced the possibility 
of same-race discrimination to support his finding that Title VII applies in 
subordination theory’s fixation on the identity of both plaintiff and defendant. Id. Further, 
while Clarke focuses primarily on missed identification cases when discussing discrimina-
tion against Whites, this Article focuses on situations where Whites discriminate against 
other Whites specifically due to acknowledging their Whiteness, thus assigning to it spe-
cific racial expectations. Id.
33. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977).
34. § 1981 secures African Americans’ rights to make and enforce contracts. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (2012). Courts have interpreted it as prohibiting racial discrimination in hiring and 
employment. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). § 1981 applies to 
all private employers, as well as to state and local governments. Courts have recognized a 
“necessary overlap” between § 1981 and Title VII. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 
553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008).
35. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 41 U.S. 604, 606 (1987).
36. Id. at 614 n.4.
37. See, e.g., Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 802 F. Supp. 
199, 206 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (stating “[c]ertainly, this Supreme Court decision has made 
clear that discrimination claims should not be barred merely because the plaintiff(s) and 
defendant(s) belong to the same race”).
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same-sex discrimination cases.38 The case dealt with a man who claimed 
he was sexually harassed by male coworkers who taunted and sexually 
abused him.39 In his opinion, Scalia acknowledged same-sex discrimina-
tion and harassment, and also directly addressed same-race discrimination: 
“In the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace we have 
rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discrimi-
nate against members of his own race.”40
Despite these statements, cases acknowledging intraracial discrimi-
nation are rare and mostly revolve around discrimination between mem-
bers of racial minority groups. Cases acknowledging intraracial discrimi-
nation between Whites are almost nonexistent—when they do reach 
courts, it is usually under a limited set of circumstances.
A.  Same-race Discrimination Between Racial Minorities
The overwhelming majority of same-race discrimination cases rec-
ognized and discussed by the courts involve racial minorities discriminat-
ing against their fellow group members. These cases are discussed at 
length by Enrique Schaerer,41 so I will mention them here only briefly.
Same-race discrimination between racial minorities was recognized 
by courts with few complications. In Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, 
I.R.S., the court declared that “[i]t would take an ethnocentric and naive 
world view to suggest that we can divide Caucasians into many sub-
groups but somehow all Blacks are part of the same sub-group. There are 
sharp and distinctive contrasts amongst native Black African peoples (sub-
Saharan) both in color and in physical characteristics.”42 Similarly, in Wil-
liams v. Wendler the Seventh Circuit posited that “there can, it is true, be 
ǥracial’ discrimination within the same race, broadly defined, because 
ǥrace’ is a fuzzy term . . . Light-skinned [B]lacks sometimes discriminate 
against dark-skinned [B]lacks, and vice versa, and either form of discrimi-
nation is literally color discrimination.”43
38. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. at 78.
41. Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in the Workplace: The Case for Race Plus,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 64-76 (2010) (reviewing race discrimination cases be-
tween racial minorities to argue courts should develop a “race plus” doctrine similar to 
the “sex plus” doctrine used for intragroup sex discrimination).
42. Walker v. Sec’y of Treasury, IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
43. Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008).
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This line of reasoning relies heavily on anti-classification logic,44
which explains same-race discrimination by redrawing the lines demar-
cating a racial group.45 Many other courts, however, have recognized 
same-race discrimination between racial minorities without resorting to 
the sub-group analyses. In Parrott v. Cheney, the plaintiff was a Black man 
who argued that his supervisor, another Black man, had discriminated 
against him on the basis of race and sex.46 While the court dismissed his 
claims on the ground that he failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, it nevertheless acknowledged the possibility of similar claims and 
focused the criteria for recognizing such discrimination on the types of 
behavior the law is aimed at remedying, instead of the identities of those 
suffering from discrimination.47 In Belton v. Shinseki, a Black female plain-
tiff claimed that her supervisor, a Black woman, discriminated against 
Black nurses.48 Here, too, the court recognized same-race discrimination 
without establishing a sub-group difference between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. In Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., the court recognized 
intraracial discrimination between Blacks while rejecting the subgroup-
based reasoning employed by other courts.49
44. This anti-classification rhetoric echoes the language in Saint Francis, where—
despite rejecting biological understandings of race—the Court nevertheless based its ruling 
on ethnic and ancestral classifications between individuals. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S 604, 613 (1987) (“[W]e have little trouble in concluding that Congress 
intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected 
to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”).
45. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613. This turn by courts and by scholars to 
colorism is understandable. First, color is an important, perhaps the most important, signi-
fier of race, and it constitutes much of the logic behind racist ideologies like White su-
premacy. In addition, Title VII’s inclusion of color as a category of prohibited discrimina-
tion makes it easier to explain and justify same-race discrimination through color-based 
sub-racial grouping. However, this framing is also limited in nature. It resorts to anti-
classification paradigms which were limited in the first place in their ability to explain in-
tragroup discrimination. Furthermore, it only works in those cases where the intraracial 
discrimination was color-based, and racist ideologies are manifested via the recognized 
categories of light/dark-skinned. In reality, many same-race discrimination cases do not 
revolve around color. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 
213, 236 (D.D.C. 2005). The context-specific logic of identifiable subgroups thus ob-
scures the ability to offer same-race discrimination a unifying explanation.
46. Parrott v. Cheney, 748 F. Supp. 312, 313 (D. Md. 1989).
47. See id. at 317 (“Title VII operates ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on 
account of unlawful employment discrimination.’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
48. Belton v. Shinseki, No. 4:08CV915RWS, 2009 WL 2488025 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 
2009).
49. Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (quoting Saint 
Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613) (“Contrary to [the] contention that only ǥsub-group’ in-
traracial discrimination is actionable, such as [W]hite defendants acting against a [W]hite 
[A]rab, or light-skinned [B]lack defendants acting against a dark-skinned [B]lack plaintiff, 
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Courts have also recognized the possibility of same-race harassment.
In Ross v. Douglas Cty., Odis Ross, a Black employee at Douglas County 
Correctional Facility, argued that his supervisor, also a Black man, used 
racial epithets when addressing him, including the n-word and “[B]lack 
boy.”50 The Eighth Circuit rejected the County’s claim that no animus 
could be proven in this case because Ross and Johnson were of the same 
race. The court reasoned that
[g]iven the Oncale decision, we have no doubt that, as a matter 
of law, a Black male could discriminate against another Black 
male “because of such individual’s race.” Such comments 
were demeaning to Ross. They could have been made to 
please Johnson’s White superior or they may have been in-
tended to create a negative and distressing environment for 
Ross. However, whatever the motive, we deem such conduct 
discriminatory.51
Similarly, in Pollock v. City of Philadelphia, a Black employee claimed that 
his Black supervisor reduced his pay without cause, spat sunflower seeds 
and shells on the floor and ordered him to clean up the mess, referred to 
him as a “dumb n****r with an easy job,” and yelled at him in front of 
others, threatening to “write him up.”52 The court ruled that there was 
“sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact” as to wheth-
er the hostile work environment was “motivated by racial bias,” adding 
that “the use of a racial slur, when combined with the broader pattern of 
mistreatment, is sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination.”53
Importantly, these cases reveal that courts are at least partially able 
to recognize the ideological underpinning of such behavior. Although 
they do not clearly articulate the possibility of internalized racism, they 
tie these acts back to White supremacy by suggesting that they were mo-
tivated by a desire to impress a White employer, or by assigning particu-
lar importance to the use of racial slurs. Under the anti-essentialist ap-
proach, when a Black employer discriminates against a fellow Black per-
person or shouts racial slurs towards him or her, it should be seen as an 
act of conforming to White supremacy’s ideological norms.
§ 1981 is a broad prohibition of racial discrimination, and ǥa distinctive physiognomy is 
not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection.”).
50. Ross v. Douglas Cty., 234 F.3d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 2000).
51. Id. at 396.
52. Pollack v. City of Philadelphia No. CIV. A. 06-4089, 2008 WL 3457043, at *2, 
*10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Pollock v. The City of Philadelphia, 403 F. 
App’x 664 (3d Cir. 2010).
53. Id. at *10.
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Despite the existence of cases dealing with intraracial discrimination 
between racial minorities, very few cases deal with such discrimination 
between Whites. This is especially interesting given the fact that courts 
often cite Oncale, which unlike other same-sex harassment cases involving 
women, discussed harassment between men (i.e., the dominant gender),
in order to explain same-race discrimination and harassment. This 
prompts the following question: what would a race version of Oncale—
i.e., when both parties are White—look like? In the following section, I 
detail the few instances where same-race discrimination cases between 
Whites have reached the courts and analyze their limited contextual fea-
tures and theorization.
B.  Same-race Discrimination Between Whites
Before I begin, it is important to acknowledge one major difference 
in Title VII litigation between racial-minority plaintiffs and White plain-
tiffs, which revolves around the extra level of protection granted to “pro-
tected classes” under Title VII. Title VII, as mentioned above, does not 
specify the groups it aims to protect. However, after courts recognized 
how difficult it is to prove discrimination, especially in hiring decisions, 
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas offered an easier route to prov-
ing discrimination for those considered members of a protected class.54
Under the McDonnell Douglas method of proof, instead of directly prov-
ing discrimination, a plaintiff may show that: (1) the plaintiff is part of a 
“protected class,” (2) the plaintiff applied for a job (3) for which he or she 
was qualified, (4) the plaintiff did not get the job, and (5) the position 
remained open even after the plaintiff was rejected.55 If all these require-
ments are met, then the burden of proof shifts to the employer to provide 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her decision, which the 
plaintiff may then rebut.56
Notably, because they are not members of a protected class, White 
plaintiffs cannot prove discrimination via the McDonnell Douglas test, 
which might explain why there seem to be fewer cases dealing with 
same-race discrimination between Whites.57 This assumption draws fur-
ther support from what Jessica Clarke has coined “protected class gate-
keeping,” a tendency on the part of courts to read the McDonnell Douglas
“protected class” requirement into all Title VII claims, limiting the ability 
54. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 802.
57. White plaintiffs fail the first requirement, that they are part of a “protected class.”
2018] Whiteness at Work 125
of plaintiffs not from protected classes to claim discrimination under the 
law.58
However, protected class gatekeeping explains only part of the pic-
ture. Another reason for the lack of intra-White discrimination cases is 
the mis-theorization and under-theorization of the cases that do reach the 
courts. In short, I argue, the courts’ tendency to de-racialize Whiteness—
to view race as something that only racial minorities possess—has led 
them to mis-theorize the few instances where intra-White discrimination 
is discussed. Thus, this section will show, recognized cases of intraracial 
discrimination are confined almost exclusively to scenarios involving ra-
cial minorities.
A review of same-race-employment-discrimination cases between 
Whites reveals that they arise in three circumstances. The first two are 
what I call “weak” intraracial discrimination cases, meaning that the in-
traracial component in these cases is accompanied by another form of dis-
crimination. The third type I call “strong” intraracial discrimination cases 
because discrimination by Whites against other Whites is located at the 
center of the legal discussion.
The first “weak” set of intraracial discrimination occur where there 
is an ethnic difference between the parties, but the court nevertheless re-
fers to both as “White.” This dynamic is found in Castaneda v. Partida 
and Saint Francis discussed above, which recognized discrimination 
against Mexican and Arab Americans, respectively.59 A similar analysis is 
at play in Covalt v. Pintar, which also deals with discrimination against a 
Mexican American plaintiff.60 While these cases are interesting in terms of 
how courts draw and understand the borders of Whiteness,61 the theoret-
ical challenge they pose to the discussion in this Article is minimal, since 
it is often recognized that ethnicity is closely linked to race.62 These cases 
can thus be framed as closer to interracial discrimination than intraracial
discrimination.63
58. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 104-06.
59. See supra notes 33-37, 44-45 and accompanying text.
60. See Covalt v. Pintar, 2008 WL 2312651, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2008).
61. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(10th ed. 2006).
62. STEPHEN CORNELL & DOUGLAS HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE: MAKING 
IDENTITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 15 (Charles Ragin et al. eds., 2007). The courts 
themselves recognize this link. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 41 U.S. 604 (1987); 
Covalt, 2008 WL 2312651, at *7.
63. The relationship between ethnicity and race is, of course, much more complex 
than I discuss here. Questions regarding what identities are included within the borders of 
Whiteness and the framing of Mexicans, Arabs, and other groups as White or non-White 
are of great importance and relevance to this discussion, as they influence the category 
itself. In that sense, the difference between interracial and intraracial is often arbitrary, 
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The second type of “weak” same-race discrimination cases are in-
terracial solidarity doctrine cases. Under the interracial solidarity doctrine, 
Whites may sue other Whites for discriminating against racial minorities 
in a way that violates their right to diversity or their interest in color-
blindness.64 One of the first cases recognizing this possibility was Traffican-
te v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a 1972 case where a White tenant 
filed a Title VIII housing-discrimination claim jointly with a Black ten-
ant, both arguing against a landlord who discriminated against Black 
housing applicants.65 The White tenant’s standing was challenged by the 
housing company, which argued he did not suffer any injury from the 
discrimination.66 Nevertheless, the Court sustained his claim, ruling that 
the plaintiff suffered an injury to his interest in interracial association.67
The interracial solidarity cases pose a greater challenge for theorizing 
Whiteness, as they bring to the surface instances where the interests of 
White individuals clash in legally recognized ways.68 However, here, too, 
discrimination against Whites accompanies another type of interracial dis-
crimination: that which occurs between Whites and racial minorities.
The “strong” type of cases involves claims of associational discrimi-
nation, where Whites discriminate against other Whites because of their 
association and relationship with racial minorities. While these cases do 
resemble those involving the interracial solidarity doctrine, they are dis-
tinct. Interracial solidarity cases emerge from claims of direct discrimina-
tion against racial minorities that have an indirect impact on the White 
plaintiff, whereas in associational discrimination cases, intraracial discrim-
contingent upon how we draw the lines between different groups, which groups are 
“within” Whiteness, and which are outside it. However, given that both Mexican Amer-
icans and Arab Americans are considered to be subjected to racialization practices, and 
given that both groups discuss themselves as racialized, I have chosen to focus the discus-
sion in this Article on the dynamics within Whiteness, between individuals who recog-
nize themselves, and each other, as White.
64. Clarke, supra note 10, at 131–32; Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2010) (both critiquing the limited range of this doctrine).
65. Traficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 210-12. Different courts and the EEOC interpreted the meaning of the right 
to interracial association differently. See Rich, supra note 64, at 1538-39. While some 
courts have adopted this doctrine, others have narrowed its scope and application. See, 
e.g., Cochran v. Five Points Temps., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (rejecting a 
claim by a White plaintiff against a racially hostile work environment); Jerome v. Midway 
Holding, 2007 WL 973968, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2007) (rejecting a racial discrimina-
tion claim by a White plaintiff based on minority-targeted racism due to her race being 
White). See also Clarke, supra note 10, at 129-30.
68. See Clarke, supra note 10; Rich, supra note 64; Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum 
Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002).
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ination is direct, and is the main dynamic discussed by the court.69 These 
cases will serve as the focus for the next section.
III. Theorizing Intra-White Discrimination Via the 
Stereotype Doctrine
A. The Current Framework—Associational Discrimination
Title VII’s language does not recognize associational discrimination 
expressly.70 While some recognition of associational discrimination claims 
is found in the lower courts,71 for many years federal courts did not rec-
ognize associational discrimination claims, adhering to a strict interpreta-
tion of Title VII.72
However, in Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co., the 
Eleventh Circuit—basing its decision on Title VII’s goals—recognized 
the possibility of race-based associational discrimination.73 The plaintiff in 
Parr was a White man who was rejected from a sales position after the 
manager discovered he was married to a Black woman. The court 
acknowledged that this employment decision was made “because of 
race.”74 Similar claims, revolving around interracial marriage, were later 
recognized by the Sixth and Fifth Circuits.75 In all these cases, the courts 
stressed that it was because of the plaintiffs’ race that they faced discrimina-
tion.76
69. See, e.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986).
70. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2017).
71. See, e.g., Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (D. Colo. 
1985); Robinett v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita, 1989 WL 21158, at *2 (D. Kan. 1989); 
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
72. Jessica Vogele, Associational Discrimination: How Far Can It Go?, 32 TOURO L. REV.
921, 927 (2016).
73. Parr, 791 F.2d at 889.
74. Id. at 889.
75. See, e.g., Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 1999); Deffen-
baugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999).
76. Parr, 791 F.2d at 892 (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an in-
terracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated
against because of his race.”); Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994 (“A White employee who is dis-
charged because his child is biracial is discriminated against on the basis of his race, even 
though the root animus for the discrimination is a prejudice against the biracial child.”); 
Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 280. See also Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“We reject this restrictive reading of Title VII. The reason is simple: 
where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves of in-
terracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the employ-
ee’s own race.”).
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Associational discrimination claims filed by White plaintiffs based on 
a friendship or workplace relationship with racial minorities rather than 
marriage proved more challenging. In Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., three 
White female plaintiffs claimed they suffered a hostile work environment 
due to their association with Black colleagues.77 One plaintiff testified that 
she was called “a bitch” after commenting on racial remarks directed at 
Black employees. White coworkers stopped talking to her and gave her 
“strange looks” every time she was friendly to Black colleagues. Her su-
pervisor began treating her worse than her colleagues. Another plaintiff 
testified that she was mocked and made fun of whenever she complained 
against the usage of the n-word and was told to “stay with her own 
kind.”78 Further, she argued that when she sought a promotion she was 
told by her supervisor that she would never be promoted due to her rela-
tionships with African American coworkers.79 The district court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that they failed to demonstrate that their 
relationship with their Black coworkers constituted a sufficient associa-
tional claim. The district court concluded that there is “no evidence, 
however, that those friendships constituted anything other than the casu-
al, friendly relationships that commonly develop among co-workers but 
that tend to be limited to the workplace.”80 The Sixth Circuit reversed, 
arguing that Title VII protects individuals, even when they are not mem-
bers of a protected class, if they are victims of discrimination due to their 
association with protected individuals.81 Furthermore, the court clarified 
that if a plaintiff shows discrimination based on association with a racial 
minority, the degree of association is irrelevant.82
Similarly, in Reiter v. Center Consolidated School District No. 26-JT, a 
White teacher claimed that her employment was not renewed due to her 
“close association with the Spanish citizens of the district.”83 The court 
accepted her claim, arguing that “[t]he underlying rationale in these cases 
is that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his race be-
cause his race was different from the race of the people he associated 
with.”84 In Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, the 
plaintiff argued that her “casual social relationship” with a Black man led 
77. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2009).
78. Id. at 510.
79. Id.
80. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
81. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2009).
82. Id. at 513. The Sixth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Drake v. 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1998).
83. Reiter v. Center Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (D. Co-
lo. 1985).
84. Id. at 1460.
2018] Whiteness at Work 129
to her discharge from the church.85 The Southern District of New York 
held that “the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in the decision to fire 
her as that of her friend. Specifying as she does that she was discharged 
because she, a White woman, associated with a Black, her complaint falls 
within the statutory language that she was ‘discharge[d] . . . because of 
[her] race.’ ”86
The associational cases’ “strong” relationship to intra-White dis-
crimination provides an interesting site for examining the “wrong” of this 
dynamic. Specifically, an examination of the courts’ theorization (and 
under-theorization) of this type of discrimination reveals paradigmatic 
problems that extend beyond these cases and help explain the limited 
recognition of same-race discrimination between Whites, and the limited 
understanding of Whiteness under Title VII in general.
B.  The Problem with the Existing Framework
The reasoning offered by courts to explain why associational cases 
are considered racial discrimination provides little to work with. In most 
cases, judges merely declare that discrimination due to one’s association 
with racial minorities is discrimination “because of race” but do not ex-
plain how or why that is the case or why such discrimination is because 
of the plaintiff’s race, rather than the race of those with whom the plain-
tiff associates.87
Some courts, however, provide a limited explanation for their deci-
sions. One example is found in Barrett.88 The court reasoned that, even 
though the White plaintiffs were not a member of a protected class, one 
of them did suffer “direct harassment resulting from her associations with 
[B]lack employees”—i.e. protected individuals.89 Here, it seems, the pro-
tection the court grants to White plaintiffs is contingent upon the protec-
tion Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas test grant to racial minorities. 
Put differently, the White plaintiff’s protection latches onto the protect-
ed-class status of racial minorities.90 This line of reasoning explains the 
85. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 
1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. Id. at 1366.
87. See, e.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 
1986); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 
1998); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2009)
89. Id. at 519.
90. Clarke argues that the protected class rationale of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work, developed to allow plaintiffs a shortcut when discrimination is hard to prove, is 
now examined even when the shortcut is not needed, thus creating a phenomenon she 
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turn some courts have taken in examining the degree of association be-
tween the plaintiff and the racial minorities with whom he or she is asso-
ciated: if these minorities’ protection rubs off on the White plaintiff, it 
must be restricted to cases where the degree of association between them 
and the plaintiff is more than casual.91 Notably, despite courts’ rejection 
of this criterion over the years, recent cases have reopened these debates 
by rejecting claims of associational discrimination based on more nominal 
levels of association with racial minorities.92
A similar but distinct line of reasoning is found in Reiter and Hol-
comb. While in Barrett the court recognized the plaintiff’s standing as de-
riving from the racial minority in the situation,93 in these cases courts ex-
plain that associational discrimination is “because of race” by focusing on 
the association itself.94 In Holcomb, the court argues: “because an employ-
er disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimina-
tion because of the employee’s own race.”95 Reiter further develops this 
logic, adding that the key point is that the plaintiff’s race “was different 
from the race of the people he associated with.”96 Here, too, the problem 
is not the plaintiff’s race per se, but rather the entanglement of the plain-
tiff’s race with African Americans, Hispanics, or other racial minorities. 
This reasoning leads back to courts’ scrutiny of the type of “protected as-
sociations” that may justify court intervention.
Neither line of reasoning leads to a finding of discrimination based 
on the plaintiff’s race alone. Further, even though I argued earlier that 
the interracial solidarity doctrine and the associational discrimination cases 
are distinct, both share one major similarity. In both, courts are only able 
coins “protected class gatekeeping.” Protected class gatekeeping occurs when courts read 
a protected class requirement into Title VII. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 104.
91. See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 
2008).
92. Zielonka v. Temple Univ., No. CIV. A. 99-5693, 2001 WL 1231746, at *1, *20 
(3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2001) (“Plaintiff did not have the type of relationship with Dr. Roget 
that alone may reasonably support an assumption that plaintiff’s race motivated the action 
he complains of.”); EEOC v. Parra, No. CIV. 05-1521-HO, 2008 WL 2185124, at *1, 
*13 (D. Or. May 22, 2008) (“[T]he law requires something more than just friendship.”); 
Salazar v. City of Commerce City, No. CIV. A. 10-cv-01328-LTB-MJW, 2012 WL
1520124, at *1, *6 (D. Colo. May 1, 2012), aff’d, 535 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(“[T]he relationships alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient, as a matter of law, to meet her 
prima facie burden of national origin discrimination by association.”).
93. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2009).
94. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008); Reiter v. Center Con-
sol. Sch. Dist. No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1985).
95. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139.
96. Reiter, 618 F. Supp. at 1460. Similar reasoning is found in Tetro v. Elliott Popham 
Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 994-95 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he essence of the alleged discrimina-
tion in the present case is the contrast in races between Tetro and his daughter.”).
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to acknowledge racial discrimination when other racial minorities are in 
the picture.97
In that sense, both signify one major privilege of Whiteness: its in-
visibility.98 According to the invisibility thesis, one of the major privileges 
associated with being White is that White people do not belong to “a
race”—only racial minorities do.99 Under the ideological regime of 
White supremacy, “White” norms, codes of behavior, and perspectives 
are considered the default, and thus are neutralized and seem to be objec-
tive and colorless.100 Accordingly, courts in both associational discrimina-
tion cases and interracial solidarity doctrine cases do not see the color 
White, but only the shadows cast onto it by Black or Brown people. On-
ly their presence allows courts to recognize racial discrimination against 
White individuals. By limiting same-race discrimination to instances in 
which racial minorities are present, intraracial discrimination between 
Whites is recognized only in a rigid set of circumstances.
Instead of conceptualizing associational cases based on the racial 
identities of those with whom the plaintiff associates or according to the 
difference between the plaintiff’s race and his or her associate’s, I suggest 
theorizing these cases via the stereotype doctrine. According to such the-
orization, plaintiffs in associational cases are discriminated against for fail-
ing to conform to stereotypes about Whiteness held by their employer or 
supervisor. Under the stereotype doctrine, racial minorities’ involvement 
would not be necessary for the court to acknowledge racial discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, such theorization manages to “see” color even when 
that color is White.
The stereotype doctrine first originated in sex discrimination juris-
prudence.101 Within that context, courts have managed to recognize in-
tragroup discrimination between men, usually in same-sex harassment cas-
es.102 This is important, as men are characterized by the “invisibility” of
their gender just as Whites are characterized by the “invisibility” of their 
race. In the coming section, I thus detail doctrinal and theoretical devel-
opments in same-sex stereotyping and harassment cases to draw lessons 
for intragroup race-based discrimination between Whites.
97. See, e.g., Traficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (applying the in-
terracial solidarity doctrine); Barrett, 556 F.3d 502 (applying the associational discrimina-
tion doctrine).
98. Writers on Whiteness have long stressed this major feature of Whiteness. See Rich, 
supra note 64, at 1511.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Sub-
jective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1994).
101. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
102. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
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C.  Lessons From Same-sex Stereotyping and Harassment
The doctrine of sexual harassment, as well as the doctrine of sex ste-
reotyping, both emerged from the “traditional” feminist paradigm of a 
female plaintiff and a male wrongdoer.103 Sexual harassment was first rec-
ognized as sex discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, where 
Mechelle Vinson sued her employer for forcing her to have sexual rela-
tions with him, touching her, and forcefully raping her on multiple occa-
sions.104 Justice Rehnquist declared that Title VII’s language is not limited 
to “tangible” discrimination and recognized sexual harassment, both in 
the form of quid pro quo sexual advances and hostile work environments 
as sex discrimination.105 Three years after Meritor Savings, the Supreme 
Court’s Price Waterhouse decision first introduced the idea of sex stereo-
typing as a form of sex discrimination into Title VII.106 Ann Hopkins, an 
exemplary employee, claimed that she was denied partnership due to sex 
discrimination, because of her failure to conform to feminine stereo-
types.107 She was described as “overly aggressive” and was advised to dress 
“more femininely” and attend “charm school” in order to improve her 
chances of partnership, despite the fact that aggressiveness and toughness 
were qualities the firm sought in partners.108 The ruling in Price Water-
house determined that stereotypes regarding how women should behave, 
how they should talk, or dress, or conduct themselves in general, amount 
103. See JANET E. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 17-20 (2006). Halley maps the three minimum conditions that make a project, 
or a claim, a feminist one. These are: m/f (making a distinction between males/female, or 
masculine/feminine); m > f (i.e., the claim/project must posit some kind of subordination 
of f by m); and, finally, carrying a brief for f, which stems from the prior conditions.
104. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Vinson v. Taylor, 753 
F.2d 141, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
105. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
106. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). A Seventh Circuit deci-
sion from 1971 made a short reference to stereotypes as a form of sex discrimination, ar-
guing that in “forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.” See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). This statement was later cited and adopted in Price Water-
house. 490 U.S. at 251. The stereotype doctrine was first developed within the constitu-
tional framework of Equal Protection, where this theory was litigated in a series of consti-
tutional cases of Equal Protection by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then head of the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project. See Bornstein, supra note 15, at 937. Notably, most of the peti-
tioners in these cases were men, challenging stereotypical norms regarding childcare re-
sponsibilities. Id.
107. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233-34.
108. Id. at 235-36.
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to sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII.109 Justice Brennen spe-
cifically condemned the “Catch 22” for women in the workplace: “out 
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”110
Despite the intergroup origin of these doctrines, both progressed be-
yond their initial categories to account for intragroup discrimination, in-
cluding discrimination between members of the dominant group. At first, 
courts were reluctant to recognize same-sex harassment cases involving 
men.111 Critiquing this tendency, Katherine Franke argued these cases 
ought to be recognized as same-sex harassment, as they “clearly show 
how sexually harassing conduct can effectively enforce particular gender 
orthodoxies in the workplace.”112 Describing the “wrong” of sexual har-
assment from the margins of same-sex harassment cases, Franke argues 
that sexual harassment should be seen as a form of sex discrimination be-
cause it operates as a “technology of sexism.”113 That is, “[i]t is a discipli-
nary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both 
harasser and victim according to a system of gender norms that envisions 
women as feminine, (hetero)sexual objects, and men as masculine, (het-
ero)sexual subjects.”114 Same-sex harassment between men is thus theo-
rized as the way in which members of the dominant group police fellow 
members in order to preserve the ideological paradigm that grants them 
this exact dominance.115 Anita Bernstein makes a similar argument with 
regard to stereotyping in general, arguing that stereotyping is a “technol-
ogy of prejudice,” which places an unjustifiable constraint on its sub-
jects.116
One year after Franke’s article, the Supreme Court decided Oncale,
officially recognizing same-sex harassment as sex discrimination under Ti-
tle VII.117 Joseph Oncale worked on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexi-
co where he was repeatedly subjected to severe sexual harassment by his 
colleagues and supervisors, who called him names “suggesting homosexu-
ality,” threatened him with rape, and sodomized him with a bar of 
109. Id. at 241-42, 250-51.
110. Id. at 251.
111. Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV.
691, 698 (1997).
112. Id. at 698.
113. Id. at 694, 696.
114. Id. at 693.
115. Id.
116. Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 680 (2013).
117. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77-79 (1998). The 
case came out one year after Katherine Franke’s Article and therefore is not discussed in 
her paper, but its facts clearly demonstrate and echo her argument.
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soap.118 Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the court, clarified that 
Title VII protects both men and women and, accordingly, grants protec-
tion from same-sex harassment.119
The Oncale ruling, combined with the concept of sex stereotyping 
developed in Price Waterhouse, has led lower courts to theorize same-sex 
harassment according to the stereotype doctrine.120 In these cases, sex ste-
reotyping and harassment are discussed jointly, with sexual harassment as 
the discriminatory practice and stereotypes regarding how men should 
behave (according to masculine standards) providing the proof that the 
harassment was “because of sex.”121
This case study of same-sex harassment and stereotyping demon-
strates the possibilities that open up once a theory of discrimination 
moves from identity to ideology. Sexism as ideology, these cases and 
Franke’s theory indicate, must enforce itself on all parties within the 
workplace in order to maintain its societal grip.122 Sexual harassment un-
der this conceptualization is not an expression of sexual desire or of men 
demonstrating dominance over women. Instead, it is a technology 
through which sexism and stereotypes regarding masculinity and feminin-
ity are enforced on all members of the workplace.123
Same-sex stereotyping and harassment cases should provide a rele-
vant framework from which to draw insights into same-race discrimina-
118. Id. at 77; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th 
Cir. 1996).
119. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-79.
120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013); Bibby v. 
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., No. 00-1261, 2001 WL 919976, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 
2001); infra note 130.
121. In Boh Bros. Constr. Co., a male ironworker claimed that he was sexually harassed 
by his employer who referred to him as “ ’pu—y,’ ‘princess,’ and ‘fa—ot,’ ” because he 
“did not conform to [his employer’s] view of how a man should act.” 731 F.3d at 449. 
The Fifth Circuit argued that gender stereotyping may provide proof that the harassment 
was “because of” sex. Id. at 456. Similarly, in Bibby, a gay employee claimed sexual har-
assment by his employer. 2001 WL 919976, at *1. The Third Circuit argued that a plain-
tiff can prove that same-sex harassment is discrimination “because of” sex by showing that 
“the harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the 
stereotypes of his or her gender.” Id. at *5. See also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms Inc., 579 
F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Doe v. City of Belle-
ville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). For a similar discussion about the links between 
same-sex harassment and stereotyping, see Bernstein, supra note 117, at 683-4.
122. Franke, supra note 111, at 693. In Althusserian terms, to reproduce the relations of 
production. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an 
Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 128 (Ben Brewster 
trans., Monthly Review Press 1971) (1968). I will elaborate on this concept later in this 
Article, see infra Part IIId.
123. See Franke, supra note 111, at 693.
2018] Whiteness at Work 135
tion. Framing harassment and stereotyping as technologies of sexism in 
the workplace, made effective through the subordination of both men 
and women, invites a parallel discussion in race.
Such an analogy should be approached with caution, as gender and 
race operate differently as systems of “othering.” Accordingly, gender ste-
reotypes play a pivotal role in enforcing the gender binary, whereas in 
the racial context racial minorities are often pressured to present them-
selves according to White norms.124 However, race, like gender, is an 
ideology and a disciplinary practice, and, like gender, it enforces and po-
lices identities.125 As critical race theorists explain, race forms through dai-
ly meeting points of institutional and individual power.126 Thus, “we are 
raced through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial 
subjectivities.”127 The applicability of principles underlying same-sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence is particularly evident in associational discrimi-
nation cases, as acts of associational discrimination serve to enforce and 
maintain a racial binary.128
D.  Back to Race—Intra-White Discrimination as Stereotyping
The understanding of race as a technology of production rather 
than an identity, as a relational dynamic that produces subjectivities and 
allocates resources and opportunities rather than a state of being, prompts 
us to isolate and study these technologies. When a White employee is 
told to “stay with her kind,”129 more than just associational discrimination 
is at play. This is a specific type of racial work aimed at subjecting that 
employee to stereotypes regarding Whiteness held by her supervisor or 
124. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006). I will elaborate on the differences between race and sex further in this Article.
125. See, e.g., LÓPEZ, supra note 61, at 82-84, 91-93.
126. Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 
79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (1993).
127. Id. See also JOHN A. POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING OUR 
CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND OTHER TO BUILD AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY 49, 53 (2015) (“In 
other words, before someone can be said to possess a racial characteristic or identity, there 
first must be a process of “racing.” This requires the social creation of racial categories, 
the assignment to categories, and determination of the meanings associated with each cat-
egory.”). Notably, this position must be distinguished from colorblindness. While both 
stances hold race to be fictional, each take a different route in addressing racism. For a
discussion on the differences between the two, as well as the importance of acknowledg-
ing race and racism to combat both, see LÓPEZ, supra note 61, at 26-125; Neil Gotanda, 
A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
128. Race-based associational discrimination stems from the ideological position that 
different races should not mix. I elaborate more on this point in the coming section.
129. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 510 (6th Cir. 2009).
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colleagues. Under this paradigm, Whiteness is seen as “pure,” an asset 
that may be diminished by the act of mixing.130 “Strange looks” in the 
hallway at White employees who associate with Black coworkers send a 
message that the plaintiff has failed to conform to her White colleagues’
expectations of her as a White person.131
Such discrimination, manifesting as hostile work environments, 
echoes Oncale and other same-sex discrimination cases involving men. In 
both scenarios, members of the dominant group police their fellow 
members in order to maintain the group’s identity, content, and borders. 
And, following the main logic of Price Waterhouse, this discrimination 
stems from wrongful stereotypes (as expectations) regarding race.
One of the key stereotypes regarding Whiteness is indeed its puri-
ty.132 Law and social practice, from the notorious “one drop rule,”133 to 
prohibitions of interracial marriage,134 to de facto and de jure segregation 
of schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces,135 not only reflect expecta-
tions regarding Whiteness’s purity and inherently assumed supremacy,136
but they are also the mechanisms that maintain it as such.137
The associational discrimination cases demonstrate that within 
workplaces governed by White supremacist ideologies, we can detect ra-
cial work at play through intragroup dynamics between Whites. Indeed, 
workplaces are not only gendered, but also raced.138 As Devon Carbado 
and Mitu Gulati argue, workplaces are often governed by racial ideolo-
gies.139 Thus, a Black employee may be incentivized to conceal racial cri-
tique or opinions in order to avoid appearing to be “racially sensitive, 
uncollegial, a potential troublemaker.”140 Carbado and Gulati’s work, as 
well as other scholarly work on workplace racialization, revolves mostly 
around how such racialization affects racial minorities and the extra bur-
den it places on their shoulders. Such arguments are important, as they 
allow antidiscrimination theory to recognize the often-hidden ways in 
130. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737 (1993) 
[hereinafter Harris, Whiteness as Property].
131. Barrett, 556 F.3d at 509.
132. See infra notes 143-145.
133. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION’S DEFINITION (2010).
134. See SHERYLL CASHIN, LOVING/: INTERRACIAL INTIMACY IN AMERICA AND THE 
THREAT TO WHITE SUPREMACY (2017).
135. Rosenthal, supra note 12.
136. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
137. LÓPEZ, supra note 61, at 84, 91–3.
138. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEG.
ISSUES 701, 702 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman]; Carbado 
& Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 24, at 1262.
139. See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 24, at 1262-63, 1263 n.8.
140. Id. at 1289-90.
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which racism and racial stereotypes intermingle with inequality. Howev-
er, little attention has been paid to how the White workplace inherently 
requires racial work within the White racial group in order to subject its 
members to racial expectations regarding Whiteness.
Importantly, Whiteness, like masculinity, is performed.141 As with 
any ideology, nonconformity by group members threatens its sustainabil-
ity.142 Some-sex discrimination cases illustrate the point perfectly.  When 
men behave or perform their identity in ways that do not conform to the 
ideal of masculintity, they risk devaluating the “worth” of maculinity, 
which is associated with dominance and control of women.143 Thus, 
group members are prompted to police men’s behavior in order to force 
them to conform to patriarchy’s ideological lines.144
Louis Althusser’s idea of interpellation—specifically the act of “hail-
ing”—helps crystallize how same-race discrimination cases work within 
the workplace.145 Althusser’s concept of interpellation is relevant here, as 
it ties together ideology and interpersonal exchange. Ideology, according 
to Althusser, constitutes concrete subjects through the act of interpella-
tion.146 The ideological apparatus manifests itself through rituals and prac-
tices in which individuals take part.147 When individuals are recognized 
and recognize themselves and their designated role in said rituals, they are
interpellated into this ideology and thus become its subjects.148 When a po-
lice officer, for instance, hails you in the street, saying “Hey, you there!”
and you turn around, you become a subject via the mere act of turning 
because you recognize this hail as being addressed to you and you take 
141. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 156 (1998); John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: 
Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 
820 (1999).
142. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32 (1982) 
(discussing the importance of political legitimacy as well as the consent of the governed to 
the exercise of political domination: “It is the notion that, in order to understand the 
modern industrial state, one has to understand its ideological power to generate consent 
from the masses through the creation of institutions, and organizations, and social patterns 
that appear legitimate to the masses of the people.”).
143. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 111, at 693.
144. Id.; R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 77–79 (2005).
145. Althusser, supra note 122, at 170-77.
146. The term “ideology,” Althusser clarifies, is “pure illusion,” Id. at 159. It represents 
the “imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” Id. at 162.
However, it has material manifestations. Id. at 166. The ideological apparatus is the source 
of an individual’s ideas, which are manifested through his material actions into material 
practices. Id. at 169. These practices themselves are also governed by rituals that the ideo-
logical apparatus defines and charges with meaning. Id. at 168.
147. Id. at 166-68.
148. Id. at 173.
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part in the practice or ritual of the governing ideology. You are formed 
as a specific type of subject—a citizen that follows the instructions and 
rituals of the regime, and inherently, its ideological apparatus.149
Althusser’s idea of interpellation is aimed at highlighting subject 
formation through ideology in more subtle interactions. However, his 
argument should apply a fortiori to harsher interactions of harassment and 
discrimination. As previously mentioned, Bernstein describes stereotypes 
as a “technology of prejudice” that unjustly constrains the individual.150
These constraints, she argues, emerge from both external and internal ste-
reotyping.151 I argue that this claim ought to be understood, in Althusseri-
an terms, as the way in which stereotyping as interpellation produces in-
dividuals as subjects who recognize themselves in the relevant ideological 
apparatus regulating the workplace. Internal constraints are therefore also 
inherently the outcome of external constraints that form the individual as 
a specific subject through interpellation. Put differently, when someone 
forces us to recognize ourselves in societal stereotypes, and we perceive 
them to be directed at us, they can also become internal(ized) constraints. 
Understanding how ideology functions in situations of workplace dis-
crimination is important because it helps highlight the structural problem 
arising from workplace discrimination as well as the reason such discrimi-
nation is “because of race.” Comments such as “stay with your kind,” we 
now see can echo a specific type of ideology, and interpellate employees 
into its subjects.
This recognition of intraracial racialization between Whites is there-
fore in line with the stereotype doctrine and Title VII. Acts of expecta-
tion policing within the workplace are not only an enforcement of White 
supremacy but are also forbidden racial stereotyping, which amount to 
forbidden racial discrimination under Title VII.
IV. New Avenues for Intra-White Discrimination: 
“White Trash” as Failing White Performativity
The value of Whiteness—or the property interest in Whiteness152—
for White supremacy is not threatened solely by the act of mixing, alt-
hough it is one of the perceived “threats” to it.153 Examining other stere-
149. Id. at 174. Notably, interpellation does not necessarily require a state agent. See
Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in 
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 124 (David Kairys ed., 1998); Gilden, 
supra note 20.
150. Bernstein, supra note 116, at 680.
151. Id. at 667.
152. Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 130, at 1713.
153. LÓPEZ, supra note 61, at 82.
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otypes regarding Whiteness as key in the production of Whiteness and 
White supremacy may open other avenues for combating regimes of 
Whiteness within the workplace. Such dynamics do not have to include 
racial minorities for courts to recognize that race is at play.
One example of intra-White discrimination may illuminate such 
possibilities. Camille Gear Rich discusses in her article “Marginal 
Whiteness” the category of “low-status Whites.” Marginal Whites, 
according to Rich, are those who “have more limited access to White 
privilege”154 and enjoy it only in “contingent, context-specific ways.”155
Further, Rich argues, high-status Whites may impose economic and 
dignitarian costs on low-status Whites in order to preserve resources for 
themselves or in order to disguise anti-Black discrimination as racially 
neutral.156 These dynamics, however, are not translated to legal language 
via current antidiscrimination doctrine.157
Indeed, similar to the understanding that Blackness is not one singu-
lar racial experience, as Gulati and Carbado’s The Fifth Black Woman illus-
trates, there are varying ways to perform Whiteness, and some are more 
socially acceptable and socially rewarded than others.158 To expand upon 
Harris’ idea of Whiteness as property,159 not all types of Whiteness per-
formativity yield similar “value.”
The type of discrimination suggested by Rich—between low- and 
high-status Whites—could potentially be litigated via the stereotype doc-
trine in cases where the circumstances indicate that the motivation for 
discrimination was based on stereotypes or expectations regarding the 
“right” way to perform Whiteness.160
One such argument is presented by both Matt Wray and Nancy Is-
enberg, who study the social othering of poor rural Whites, or “White 
154. Rich, supra note 64, at 1505.
155. Id. at 1516.
156. Id. at 1503-04.
157. Id. at 1504. While Rich focuses her critique on the interracial solidarity doctrine, 
my argument applies to all intra-White discrimination dynamics stemming from stereo-
types regarding Whiteness.
158. Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 138, at 701-03.
159. Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 130.
160. Using Rich’s argument regarding marginal Whiteness prompts me to make one 
important distinction between her argument and mine. While Rich’s move is to 
acknowledge “marginal Whites” or “low-status Whites” as a unique and distinct social 
group, existing between and in addition to other categories, my suggestion is rather to 
complexify our understanding of how the racial binary is maintained via technologies of 
racism aimed at policing individuals to adhere to norms regarding Whiteness.
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trash.”161 As Wray argues, individuals referred to as “White trash” were 
historically seen by high-status Whites as a social group threatening the 
“contamination” of the White race and were accordingly perceived as 
“filthy,” “lazy,”162 and morally and evolutionarily inferior.163 Isenberg 
adds that White trash individuals were socially understood as those “who 
lack the civic markers of stability, productivity, economic value, and human 
worth.”164 This is specifically relevant to our discussion as stereotypes re-
garding White trash collide with qualities employers seek in potential 
employees. Accordingly, stereotypes against poor rural Whites can lead to 
employment discrimination.165
Stereotypes associated with poor rural Whites should not be mistak-
en as merely class stereotypes. Importantly, they were always created to 
distance White trash from the core of Whiteness, not affluency;166 scien-
tists described their “yellowish”, tallow-colored skin, which was ex-
plained both through the depiction of them as “clay eaters” as well as 
through interracial sex “leaving traces” of “negro blood.”167
Furthermore, similar symbolic properties, characteristics, and traits 
were used from very early on to refer to both Blacks and poor Whites. As 
Wray notes,
161. MATT WRAY, NOT QUITE WHITE: WHITE TRASH AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
WHITENESS (2006); NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY 
OF CLASS IN AMERICA (2016).
162. WRAY, supra note 161, at 22, 65.
163. Id. at 16, 96.
164. ISENBERG, supra note 161, at 315 (emphasis added).
165. As Gulati and Carbado rightly stress, not all stereotypes are necessarily negative, 
and at times employees can “use prejudice” for their advancement, for instance stereo-
types according to which Korean Americans are hard-working and technically inclined. 
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 24, at 1304-05. Therefore, acknowledging 
the conflicting nature of the stereotypes against poor rural Whites and what is considered 
to be necessary within the workplace highlight the potential of anti-White-trash stereo-
types to lead to discrimination.
166. See WRAY, supra note 161, at 139 (discussing the idea of “lack of whiteness” pos-
sessed by poor Whites).
167. ISENBERG, supra note 161, at 151; WRAY, supra note 161, at 40, 77. Interestingly, 
the 19th century accusation of White trash and “scalawag” as associating too much with 
“freedmen,” see ISENBERG, supra note 161, at 184, is at the intersection of both lines of 
stereotyping developed in this Article: the discussion regarding associational discrimina-
tion and the discussion regarding White trash. This is perhaps not surprising, given the 
framework that sees them both as limbs of one body, that of Whiteness policing. Accord-
ingly, stereotypes regarding the “right” way to perform Whiteness go hand in hand with 
efforts to keep Whiteness pure. Furthermore, this dynamic, which ties together hostile 
positions towards “White trash” and racial minorities, is also apparent in present day Title 
VII discrimination litigation. See infra Part V.
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[b]ehaviors and attitudes regarding conventional morality and 
work were particularly salient here, with the lower classes and 
lower races typically characterized as holding deep aversions to 
both. Also highly salient in the minds of observers were be-
haviors regarding cleanliness—the lower sorts were consistent-
ly characterized as dirty, smelly, and unclean. What is striking 
about reading historical documents of the period then is the 
similar ways in which poor Whites, Indians, and Blacks are 
described—as immoral, lazy, and dirty.168
Certainly, stereotypes regarding Whites as clean, moral, and hard-
working historically constituted the racial lines between Whites and 
Blacks in the U.S. and thus constituted the core around which the con-
cept of Whiteness was formed.169 Accordingly, discrimination against 
White trash could be analyzed as stemming from their failing perfor-
mance of Whiteness.
Instances where such stereotypes are the motivation behind intrara-
cial discrimination between Whites should be seen as a form of policing 
Whites back into the boundaries of acceptable Whiteness and thus as a 
form of illegal racial discrimination. Notably, while discriminating against 
or stereotyping poor rural Whites may stem partially from class, § 703(m) 
of Title VII acknowledges the possibility of mixed-motive discrimina-
tion. Thus, being able to show that discriminatory treatment stemmed 
partly from stereotypes about the “proper” performance of Whiteness is 
sufficient even if the discrimination was also motivated by other reasons.
A better, more nuanced theorization of same-race discrimination 
cases could account for the possibility of discrimination by high-status 
Whites against low-status Whites and explain it as racially motivated dis-
crimination.
168. WRAY, supra note 161, at 23. For more on that similarity, see for instance this 
1956 quote with which Thomas Sowell opens his Black Rednecks and White Liberals:
“These people are creating a terrible problem in our cities. They can’t or won’t hold a 
job, they flout the law constantly and neglect their children, they drink too much and 
their moral standards would shame an alley cat. For some reason or other, they absolutely 
refuse to accommodate themselves to any kind of decent, civilized life.” THOMAS 
SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS AND WHITE LIBERALS 1 (2005). As he immediately states, 
while many would mistake this quote as referring to racial minorities, it was said about 
poor Whites living in Indianapolis. Id.
169. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370-76 (1988). See
also JUAN WILLIAMS, MY SOUL LOOKS BACK IN WONDER: VOICES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
EXPERIENCE 9 (2005); PATRICIA A. TURNER, CERAMIC UNCLES & CELLULOID 
MAMMIES: BLACK IMAGES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON CULTURE 65-66 (1994).
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V. The Anti-Subordination Challenge
At the beginning of this Article, I presented three competing views 
on antidiscrimination to argue that anti-essentialism is favorable both in 
advancing Title VII’s goals and in dealing with intragroup discrimina-
tion.170 However, my argument regarding intraracial racialization may al-
so resonate with both anti-classification and anti-subordination theorists.
The challenge posed by anti-classificationists is rather minimal. Even 
though I have argued that anti-essentialism is better suited to explaining
the phenomenon of intraracial racialization, I believe that once it is theo-
rized, anti-classificationists would agree that any race-based classifications 
between White workers are unacceptable.
Anti-subordination theorists might have a harder time accepting my 
proposition. Some might fear that allowing White plaintiffs to sue for ra-
cial discrimination is the legal manifestation of “all lives matter”171 and 
that it risks ignoring the reality in which racial minorities are the primary 
targets of racial discrimination in the workplace. Further, and especially 
due to the damaging effect that White plaintiffs have had on the ad-
vancement of Title VII litigation, for instance in Ricci,172 anti-
subordination theorists might argue that opening up more legal avenues 
for Whites to claim racial discrimination requires meaningful justification. 
In this section, I dispel some of the apprehension this argument might 
cause and present several arguments that illustrate how the under-
theorization of intra-White discrimination is harming racial minorities’
interests, thus highlighting the positive externalities of my suggestion for 
the goals of anti-subordination theory.
170. See supra Part I.
171. Clarke, supra note 10, at 156.
172. In Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), a group of White firefighters claimed 
discrimination under Title VII after city officials chose to ignore the results of a test they 
had all passed, qualifying them for a promotion. The city’s invalidation of the test result
stemmed from the fact that no Black firefighters passed it, and officials feared that accept-
ing the results would expose them to a disparate impact discrimination lawsuit from the 
Black firefighters. The Supreme Court held that the decision to ignore the test results was 
in violation of Title VII as it was an impermissible race-based decision, adding that the 
city could have ignored the results only if it had a “strong basis in evidence” that, had it 
not taken the action, it would have been liable to a disparate impact claim. Ricci, 557 U.S. 
at 563.
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A.  De-racialization of Whiteness Grants White Employers 
Immunity From Lawsuits
On a pragmatic level, the inability to acknowledge diverse scenarios 
of intra-White discrimination grants White employers immunity from 
discrimination lawsuits that Black employers do not enjoy.
Recall that under the courts’ broad understanding of same-race dis-
crimination between racial minorities, discrimination “because of race”
has been analyzed and understood according to the relevant circumstanc-
es of each case and includes acts of racial harassment in the form of re-
peated racial slurs.173
In striking contrast, and in keeping with the example of high/low-
status Whites, a review of all Title VII cases including the phrase “White 
trash” or “hillbilly” reveals that there are almost no cases in which White 
employers have been sued for referring to their employees as “White 
trash.”174 Rather, the majority of those accused of using this term within 
these cases are racial minorities,175 either in “reverse racism” discrimina-
tion cases176 or when racial minorities sue for racial discrimination, and 
then face accusations that they themselves engaged in a racially charged 
manner by referring to colleagues or supervisors as “White trash.”177
This is not a reflection of societal reality, but rather of the narrow 
range of cases that find a place within Title VII courts. It thus appears 
173. See supra Part IIa.
174. A Westlaw search conducted on April 10, 2017 for the phrase “White trash” or 
“hillbilly” and “Title VII” produced 71 relevant results (omitting repeating results and 
mere mentioning of the phrase as a side note). Out of these cases, only four cases (approx-
imately 5.6 percent) discussed White plaintiffs suing their White employer for referring to 
them by the term “White trash.”
175. In 33 (approximately 46.5 percent) of these cases, the person using the term was a 
racial minority. In 23 (approximately 32 percent) of these cases, the identity of the speak-
er was unknown, and in 15 (approximately 21 percent) of these cases, the speaker was 
White.
176. Charest v. Sunny-Aakash, LLC, 2017 WL 4169701 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2017);
Atkins v. Denso Mfg. Tennessee, Inc., 2011 WL 5023392 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2011); 
Hood v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 72 F. Supp. 3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (dealing with 
the term “hillbilly”); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229 
(S.D. Ga. 1995); Braid v. MJ Peterson Corp., 208 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000); Schiraldi v. 
AMPCO Sys. Parking, 9 F. Supp. 2d 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Julian v. Safelite Glass 
Corp., 994 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Scarbrough v. Gray Line Tours, 2004 WL 
941729 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2004); Fuelling v. New Vision Med. Labs. LLC, 284 F. 
App’x 247 (6th Cir. 2008).
177. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Atrium, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Ariz. 2002); EEOC v. 
Champion Intern. Corp., 1995 WL 488333 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1995); Evans v. Hussmann 
Corp., 2007 WL 2303730 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2007); Morris v. Overnite Transp. Co., 
2005 WL 2291188 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2005); Canady v. John Morrell & Co., 247 F. 
Supp. 2d 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
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that within the imagined borders of Title VII litigation, mostly racial mi-
norities use the words “White trash” to refer to White colleagues and 
employees and, almost exclusively, they are the ones reprehended for do-
ing so.
In only a few instances did White employees try to argue that they 
were harassed by other White coworkers or supervisors using the term 
“White trash.”178 In some of them, female plaintiffs attempted to explain 
the use of the term by their male supervisor as creating a sex-based hostile 
work environment. These were mostly rejected for failing to prove that 
the term was motivated by their sex.179 In the only case where a White 
employee claimed a race-based hostile work environment due to the use 
of the term “White trash” by her White coworkers, the court granted the 
defendant’s request for summary judgment on the hostile work environ-
ment claim, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove that her col-
leagues had any “racial animus” towards her.180
178. As mentioned, these cases amount to approximately 5.6 percent of the cases. See
note 174.
179. See, e.g., Schofield v. Maverik Country Store, 26. F. Supp. 3d 1147 (D. Utah 
2014); Sacco v. Legg Mason Inv. Counsel & Trust Co., 660 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Conn. 
2009). Notably, one such attempt was fruitful. See Huff v. Sw. Va. Reg’l Jail Auth., No. 
1:09cv00041, 2009 WL 3326889 (W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2009). The case discussed a doctor 
who referred to a female nurse as “stupid,” “incompetent,” and as a “hillbilly.” Id. at *1. 
The court found that these comments are sex-based as they were directed only at female 
nurses:
I find that Huff has presented sufficient evidence to show that Dr. Ofagh’s 
comments and behavior were based on her sex. Although the majority of 
Dr. Ofagh’s comments were not directly related to gender, Huff has testified 
that he spoke only to the female nurses in such derogatory terms, including 
“stupid,” “incompetent” and “hillbilly.”
Id. at *7. The case was nevertheless dismissed, as the court ruled that Huff failed to show 
that the comments were sufficiently “severe and pervasive.” Id.
180. Hoffman v. Winco Holdings, Inc., 2008 WL 5255902 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2008). 
Other interesting findings from this review illustrate how some racial minorities sue for a 
“reverse” interracial solidarity doctrine, arguing they suffered retaliation for complaining 
about racial comments directed at their White colleagues. See, e.g., Kess v. Mun. Emps. 
Credit Union of Balt., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D. Md. 2004); Ambris v. City of 
Cleveland, 2012 WL 5874367 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2012); Mosby-Grant v. City of 
Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2010); Davy v. Star Packaging Corp., 517 F. App’x 
874 (11th Cir. 2013); Brown v. CSX Transp., 2013 WL 5305664 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 
2013). Finally, in many cases, the same employer targets both “White trash” and racial 
minorities. 26 (approximately 36.5 percent) of the cases I reviewed demonstrated patterns 
of combined racism to both racial minorities and “White trash.” This could potentially 
support a claim that the animus towards “White trash” was part of a general ideology of 
White supremacy. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Terrazzo, Inc., 2015 WL 926575 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2015); Okokuro v. Com. Dep’t of Welfare, 2001 WL 185547 
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The current understating of same-race discrimination thus reinforc-
es a kind of meta-inequality—inequality in the enforcement of antidis-
crimination laws where White supervisors and employers receive de facto
immunity from discrimination charges to which non-Whites are current-
ly exposed. The inability to acknowledge intraracial discriminatory pat-
terns within Whiteness, except for specific and limited circumstances, 
creates a shield around Whiteness that protects the most powerful mem-
bers of the group.181
B. De-racialization of Whiteness 
Redirects Whites’ Claims Towards Racial Minorities
If various intra-White conflicts and discriminatory practices exist in 
society but receive no legal redress through antidiscrimination laws, in-
stances of discrimination remain individualized and lose social meaning 
and importance. The assumed cohesiveness of Whiteness within Title VII 
thus pits marginalized social groups from different races against each oth-
er, at times placing the advancement of Blacks and other racial minorities 
at risk.182
The following hypothetical might help illuminate my point. Let’s 
assume, for this discussion, that a White person (Bob) who fails to con-
form to White stereotypes is subject to bias by fellow Whites. He applies 
for a job with a White employer, and, after several remarks from his po-
tential employer about rural Whites not being “White enough” or good 
enough for the job, or questions regarding his hygienic routine, he is not 
accepted for the position. Now let’s say that in scenario A, another 
White person (with different performativity markers) gets the job. In sce-
nario B, a Black candidate (regardless of his status) gets the job rather than 
Bob. Under the current theorization of same-race discrimination be-
tween Whites within Title VII, only in scenario B does Bob have legal 
recourse, and he can only articulate it as “reverse racism” or as illegiti-
mate affirmative action, arguing that he did not get the job because he is 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2001); Crawford v. BNSF Ry. Co., 665 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2012); 
Williams v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 2006 WL 2131299 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2006); 
Guy v. City of Phoenix, 668 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Ariz. 1987).
181. Clarke rightly points out another pragmatic argument for allowing Whites to sue 
for racial discrimination: opening up more possibilities of same-race discrimination be-
tween Whites may diminish the negative incentive to hire racial minorities, as they are 
often seen as a “litigation risk.” Clarke, supra note 10, at 159-61.
182. Rich talks about the risk of pitting marginalized groups against each other in her 
critique of the limited scope of the interracial solidarity doctrine. Rich, supra note 64, at 
1590.
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White. Perhaps due to cognitive dissonance (along with a racist bias), 
Bob will eventually convince himself that being White (rather than not 
being White enough) is what cost him the job. Title VII’s inability to 
acknowledge the complex patterns of intraracial racialization prevents 
Bob from describing his grievance differently.
An inability to recognize the nature of discrimination between 
Whites thus places racial minorities’ advancement (e.g., job opportuni-
ties) at risk of being dismissed as resulting from bias or affirmative action 
while similar advancements by Whites are framed as neutral and merit-
based.
C De-racialization of Whiteness Reinforces the Category of Whiteness as 
Neutral and Invisible
The inability to acknowledge the various intraracial discriminatory 
practices between Whites leads to the construction of Whiteness as a co-
hesive, singular, natural, and, simultaneously, invisible category.183 As 
mentioned above, one of the main technologies of Whiteness is its ability 
to seem as the norm, thus masking its racial coloring.184 Under this para-
digm, Whiteness must be constantly constructed and concealed.185 Ac-
knowledging the racial work necessary to maintain Whiteness exposes 
Whiteness as a project of White supremacy. This is most evident in asso-
ciational discrimination cases, in which racial work in preventing the 
mixing of races historically has been more visible. Revealing and expos-
ing hidden divisions within Whiteness may also subvert the natural and 
neutral conventions regarding Whiteness. Acknowledging that not all 
Whites perform Whiteness in the same way and do not enjoy Whiteness 
in similar ways forces us to see Whiteness not as flowing naturally (and 
merely) from skin color, biology, or ancestry but rather as a mechanism 
of power, constructed on an ongoing basis to maintain and justify domi-
nance and supremacy.
In addition, providing White plaintiffs with legal avenues to name, 
blame, and claim186 intraracial racialization and discrimination may also 
help undermine these marginal White groups’ current broad loyalty to 
Whiteness and fellow Whites simply due to their assumed Whiteness. 
183. I thank Ido Katri for helping me think through this point.
184. See supra Part IIb.
185. Gotanda, supra note 127, at 6.
186. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. SOC. REV. 631, 635-36 (1980).
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Such a legal development may have significant implications for the viabil-
ity of Whiteness as a social project.187
My project is therefore not an attempt to merely describe low-status 
Whites—for instance, through the rhetoric of identity politics—in what 
Nancy Fraser would describe as an “[a]ffirmative strategy for redressing 
injustice.”188 Rather, my project uses divisions within Whiteness as a cata-
lyst for transformative change towards its dismantling—one that may 
push people away from the fiction of Whiteness and challenge the seem-
ingly natural/biological regime of White supremacy.189
D.  De-racialization of Whiteness Maintains the 
Whiteness of Workplaces
One of the challenges to antidiscrimination law generally, and to 
the stereotype doctrine specifically, is how to address the discriminatory 
norms of the workplace via existing legal tools. In Price Waterhouse, the 
Court rightly recognized that the defendant’s company encouraged 
norms socially associated with masculinity, such as aggressiveness and 
toughness.190 Recall Justice Brennan’s critique of the “Catch 22” for 
women in the workplace: out of the partnership track if not aggressive 
enough, and out of it if they are.191 While the struggle to allow women to 
behave aggressively in the workplace is a necessary step towards equality, 
it still only challenges half of the equation, as it accepts the gendering of 
the workplace as masculine, leaving that aspect of hetero-patriarchy in-
tact.192 “Catch 22” arguments are thus powerful, but also limiting. When 
women have tried to challenge masculinity norms in the workplace, in 
instances without similar double binds, these attempts generally have 
been unsuccessful. This is effectively illustrated by cases where women 
tried challenging grooming codes in the workplaces,193 as well by the 
Wal-Mart decision.194
187. Ian Haney López argues that the only way to dismantle racism is to dismantle 
Whiteness. See LÓPEZ, supra note 61, at 132. This last argument thus follows his argument 
by offering concrete legal avenues to achieve it.
188. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 74 (Jel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke 
trans., Verso 2003).
189. Id. at 72-78.
190. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251(1989).
191. Id.
192. For an explanation of hetero-patriarchy, see supra note 23.
193. For cases where women tried to challenge grooming policies within the work-
place, for instance, policies requiring them to wear make-up, see Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
194. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344 (2011).
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Interestingly, it was the same-sex discrimination cases between men 
that forced courts to tackle the hyper-masculinity of many workplaces.195
The male privilege of performing masculinity without being stereotyped 
or discriminated against rendered the “Catch 22” argument irrelevant—
men simply do not face the type of “Catch 22” situation described by 
Brennan. However, the inability to fall back on “Catch 22” arguments 
focused the discussion around the various ways in which the masculinity 
of workplaces harmed men who failed, or simply did not want to con-
form to expected masculine behavior.196
Acknowledging the limited scope of “Catch 22” arguments is im-
portant when shifting our discussion from sex back to race. As Kenji 
Yoshino stresses, while racial minorities are often required to “cover”
traits that do not conform to the dominant White culture, women are 
socially expected to simultaneously “cover” and “reverse cover.”197 Put 
differently, racial minorities who “dress [W]hite” or “speak unaccented 
English” find safe harbor while women are generally expected to act 
feminine.198 Therefore, “Catch 22” arguments are mostly irrelevant with 
regard to racial discrimination. This could explain why Title VII juris-
prudence has not developed a racial stereotype doctrine alongside the sex 
stereotype doctrine.199
However, the general expectation that racial minorities “cover,”
while sparing them the “Catch 22” scenario, does not mean they do not 
bear the costs of conforming to the White norms of most workplaces. 
The often-invisible racialization of many workplaces places a heightened 
burden on the shoulders of racial minorities to perform their working 
identity strategically. Such acts of strategic performance consume time 
and effort, and they often come with psychological costs and potential 
risks.200
Enabling White plaintiffs to sue employers who pressure them to 
perform Whiteness in a certain way could help racial minorities in chal-
lenging the racial norms of the workplace. By grounding same-race dis-
195. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. YOSHINO, supra note 124, at 145-47.
198. Id. Yoshino mentions the possibility of racial minorities being caught in another 
type of “Catch 22” situation, not by White demands alone, but rather as a result of cross-
expectations from the White community and their own community—which often ex-
pects its members to stress their unique traits. Id.
199. See Bornstein, supra note 14, at 964.
200. See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 24, at 1278, 1291-92. Carbado 
and Gulati detail two such risks. First, the risk that “others will identify the performative 
element of an outsider’s behavior as strategic and manipulative,” and “[s]econd, when 
multiple interconnected stereotypes operate simultaneously, the risk exists that taking 
steps to negate one kind of stereotype will activate some other negative stereotype.” Id.
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crimination between Whites in the stereotype doctrine White plaintiffs 
would be incentivized to expose the racialized nature of Whiteness and 
the mechanisms through which it polices employee behavior. Exposure 
of hidden norms opens the way for their subversion. Opening legal ave-
nues for White plaintiffs to sue their White employers or supervisors is 
therefore in the interest of racial minorities.
VI. Practical Suggestion
This Article argues that same-race discrimination between Whites 
ought to be theorized and understood via the stereotype doctrine. While 
the practical implications of this argument are self-evident, it is neverthe-
less worth sketching very briefly how such cases might look.
Applying the stereotype doctrine, courts should allow a White 
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case that discrimination was “because of 
race” by showing that the discrimination stemmed from perceived failure 
to properly perform their Whiteness. Whether a plaintiff has proven such 
a prima facie case due to stereotypes regarding Whiteness should be de-
cided according to the unique circumstances in each case.
Accordingly, the doctrine of racial stereotypes regarding Whiteness 
will develop on a case-by-case basis. This is important, as the content of 
Whiteness shifts and changes according to the needs of the ideology of 
White supremacy. The rise of the Alt-right and White supremacy 
movements since Trump’s election in 2016, for instance, could bring 
forth new dynamics of intraracial racialization that courts will have to ad-
dress.201 Such movements may charge Whiteness with new meanings that 
expand the inner expectation from its members beyond the idea of “puri-
ty,” already addressed under the associational cases. A flexible doctrine of 
racial stereotypes, and its adaptation to same-race discrimination patterns 
between Whites, would thus be able to accommodate such changes.
Finally, the McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires that 
plaintiffs be members of a protected class, will not be available to White 
plaintiffs. This asymmetry between White plaintiffs and racial minorities 
is appropriate, given the asymmetry between the respective privilege of 
Whites and racial minorities. While the invisible nature of Whiteness 
could make it hard for White plaintiffs to prove that the discrimination 
they faced was “because of race,” cases in which the enforcement of 
White norms is overt should nevertheless lead courts to acknowledge the 
possibility of race-based discrimination between Whites. With time and 
201. GEORGE HAWLEY, MAKING SENSE OF THE ALT-RIGHT 113-121 (2017); James 
Cook, The Rise of the Alt-Right, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/
news/election-us-2016-37899026. 
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doctrinal developments, proving such patterns of same-race discrimina-
tion should become easier.
CONCLUSION
Matt Wray finishes his book Not Quite White with an excerpt from 
Erskine Caldwell’s God’s Little Acre.202 The novel depicts a group of poor 
southern Whites digging for gold without luck. Their “futile mining ef-
forts are destroying what little is left of their land.”203 The secret to find-
ing gold, local folk wisdom says, is finding an albino. “[A] man ain’t got 
as much of a chance as a snowball in hell without an albino to help,” one 
of the characters, Pluto, says at the beginning of the novel.204 Albinos ap-
parently possess the magical ability to find gold. When protagonist Ty Ty 
Walden inquires as to what an albino is, Pluto explains: “An albino is one 
of these all-white men, Ty Ty. They’re all white; hair, eyes, and all, they 
say . . . It’s the all-whiteness, Ty Ty.”205 So, their only way to find gold 
and to enjoy wealth and success is “to have pure Whiteness on their 
side.”206
This anecdote illustrates my argument regarding Whiteness as a so-
cial goal rather than merely a biological trait. The magical albino, much 
like the “ultimate macho man” or the “perfect lady” (that Price Water-
house executives were envisioning), serves as a mythical state of being that 
no one can actually fully obtain207 but that everyone nevertheless seeks.208
The albino here is the epitome of the White man—his blood is pure, 
removing any doubt or suspicions of interracial association. He is the one 
who can find gold and is thus the one poor Whites must aspire to find, to 
be.
202. WRAY, supra note 161, at 133-4.
203. Id.
204. ERSKINE CALDWELL, GOD’S LITTLE ACRE 6 (1933).
205. Id. at 9-11.
206. Id.
207. See generally id. Notably, in God’s Little Acre, Ty Ty Walden eventually finds an 
albino, but that too does not help him, and the novel ends with his continuing obsessive 
digging in the search for gold. Id. at 302.
208. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS 
OF “SEX” 125 (1993)  (“[H]eterosexual performativity is beset by an anxiety that it can 
never fully overcome, that its efforts to become its own idealizations can never be finally 
or fully achieved . . . .”); See also KATHRIN HÖRSCHELMANN & BETTINA VAN HOVEN,
SPACES OF MASCULINITIES 186-7 (2013) (“[T]he clear route to achieving masculinity is 
never quite within reach, it remains knowable only in part. Only through repeated itera-
tions of male performativities can a man feel comfortable or settled in his masculinity. 
Masculinity can only be ‘stored’ for a very short while, and masculine subjectivity must be 
constantly enacted; a fall from grace is always possible if the performance suffers.”).
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The efforts to attain the idealized version of Whiteness, masculinity, 
or femininity define social categories and boundaries.209 The inevitable 
gaps between the ways we perform our identities and the mythical ideals 
we aspire to reach are the spaces into which stereotype-based discrimina-
tion often enters. Such acts of discrimination are simultaneously a reflec-
tion of individuals’ failed attempts to become the ideal subjects of hege-
monic ideologies and a mechanism through which these ideologies keep 
individuals in line by imposing social sanctions on those who fail or re-
fuse to fall in line.
Being able to identify the racialized nature of such discrimination 
reveals the power of the stereotype doctrine. Specifically, the stereotype 
doctrine provides a remedy for discrimination against those who do not 
conform to these identitarian mythologies.
This Article has suggested that same-race discrimination is often a 
form of intraracial racialization, i.e. a way in which racial expectations are 
enforced on members of a racial group by their fellow members. By uti-
lizing the stereotype doctrine, these practices can be recognized as 
wrongful race discrimination under Title VII.
Courts’ tendency to de-racialize Whiteness and view it as invisible 
has led to a limited doctrine of same-race discrimination between Whites,
one which recognizes the possibility of such discrimination being “be-
cause of race” only when racial minorities are involved. The stereotype 
doctrine has the potential to racialize Whiteness by exposing the racial 
work necessary to maintain its content, meaning, and borders and, in do-
ing so, also lead to its subversion.
209. See generally, IAN DAVIS, STORIES OF MEN AND TEACHING: A NEW NARRATIVE 
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING MASCULINITY AND EDUCATION 15 (2014)
(“[H]egemonic masculinity helps maintain gender divisions, and manage power imbalanc-
es in favour of the masculine even when the masculine ideal is never fully achieved.”).
